The intensified international migration pressures of the recent decades prompted many developed countries to revise their immigration regulations and increase border controls. However, the development of these reforms as well as their effectiveness in actually managing new immigration flows remains poorly understood. The main reason is that migration regulations are hard to quantify, which has prevented the construction of a universal measure of migration policy. To fill this gap in the literature, we construct an indicator of the restrictiveness of immigration entry policy across countries as well as a more comprehensive indicator of migration policy that also accounts for staying requirements and regulations to foster integration. These indexes are then used to disentangle the factors determining the toughness of migration regulations. Our empirical framework combines elements from the median voter and interest group approach and accounts for cross-country correlation in migration ... countries as well as a more comprehensive indicator of migration policy that also accounts for staying requirements and regulations to foster integration. These indexes are then used to disentangle the factors determining the toughness of migration regulations. Our empirical framework combines elements from the median voter and interest group approach and accounts for cross-country correlation in migration policies. We find strong evidence of spatial correlation in particular in entry restrictiveness, while the impact of economic determinants of migration policy remains much more modest.
Introduction
In his review of research on the economics of international migration, Hatton (2014, p.47) notes that 'One of the biggest challenges has been to somehow characterise subtle and complex migration policies in 1 the form of index numbers, something that recent studies have attempted to do.' A synthetic indicator by which migration policy can be measured and which is comparable between countries in terms of their openness to immigration does not exist. As a result, '[p] olicy formation is central to the immigration debate, yet until recently, it has largely been the domain of political science rather than economics' (Hatton, 2014, p.46) . Moreover, little is known about how a country's migration policies are set and to what extent they have actually managed to shape recent worldwide migration patterns.
For the most part, this gap in the literature is due to the lack of comprehensive and comparable data on immigration policies. As pointed out by Czaika and De Haas (2013) the qualitative nature of migration policies has hindered the development of a systematic method for measuring and classifying migration policies across countries and over time. The reason is that most countries do not set their migration policy in a uniform way by means of overall quotas, but allow for different entry tracks based on multiple criteria.
Only a limited number of data collection initiatives construct migration policy indexes that can effectively be compared across countries and time. Despite the range of available migration policy indicators, none of them offers a measure of a country's overall openness towards international migration. Most available indicators tend to focus on specific aspects of migration policy such as citizenship policies, integration policies or non-discrimination policies alone, thereby ignoring potential interaction or compensation effects. In addition, their country and time coverage can be quite limited and the weighting schemes to construct composite indexes from the data are often arbitrary, or lack transparency. In fact, in their overview of indicators of migration policy, Bjerre et al. (2015) note that of the three stages of index building (i.e. conceptualisation, measurement and aggregation), all efforts to quantify policy so far have been limited to the first two stages. Methodological questions regarding aggregation, such as how to combine quantitative and qualitative information, which weighting scheme to choose and how to deal with missing values, measurement errors and heterogeneous data quality have received much less attention.
This paper proposes to aggregate the existing information on the restrictiveness of migration policy using a Bayesian state-space model, a statistically-determined weighting scheme. The novelty of this technique is that it is able to account for measurement errors in the underlying indicators. As such, we can use the information in indicators of varying quality and correct for the (in)accuracy of the estimated migration policy indexes in any subsequent computations or regressions. In addition, by making use of the time-dependence in the underlying indicators, the state-space model circumvents the problem of missing observations. As a result, it provides more stable and reliable estimates while significantly increasing data availability and coverage without imputations or other ad-hoc manipulations. We use this methodology to combine all publicly available data sources that are informative on migration policies into an index of entry restrictiveness as well as a more comprehensive indicator of migration policy restrictiveness (available upon request). The latter also accounts for regulations concerning stay requirements and integration (e.g. the rules regarding family reunion), as those influence the ease of residence of an immigrant in a host country and can be seen as indirect entry restrictions.
After constructing these synthetic indexes of migration policy, we proceed to identify and disentangle the determinants of legal barriers to immigration in OECD countries. The literature on the determinants of immigration policy is scarce and applies either a median voter approach (Hix and Noury, 2007; Milner and Tingley, 2011; Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011) or an interest group approach (Facchini and Mayda, 2008) . These studies bypassed the construction of an indicator of immigration policy by restricting the focus to the voting behaviour of legislators on immigration law projects or proposals (e.g. in the US house of representatives), or the attributed number of visa. The new indicators that we construct, in contrast, allow for a cross-country panel analysis of economic and political determinants corresponding to both median voter and interest group approaches. Moreover, it allows us to consider the spatial correlation in migration policies. Countries take the behaviour of neighbouring governments into account when managing their own immigration flows, as was shown by Timmer and Williams (1998) for the late 19 th and early 20 th century and Boeri and Brücker (2005) for the EU15 countries after the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.
In the next section, we briefly describe the existing migration policy indicators which we will use to construct our migration policy indexes, as well as the construction of our indexes of migration policy using the state-space model. In the third section, we discuss our findings regarding the determinants of migration policy from a cross-country analysis. The final section concludes and discusses topics for further research.
2 The measurement of migration policy
Overview and selection of individual migration policy databases
For the selection of individual measures of immigration policies, we rely on five criteria as suggested by
De Lombaerde et al. (2008) : availability, relevance, comparability, timeliness and accuracy. Specifically, we select all law-based measures that are publicly available (both levels and changes) dealing with economic migration in recent decades (excluding regulations that apply strictly to asylum policy). 1 We do not consider outcome-based measures of immigration policy because these conflate the results of a country's immigration laws (such as the scarcity of visas or immigration quota) with its intended objectives (Clark et al., 2007; Hatton, 2004; Berthélemy et al., 2009; Hatton and Williamson, 2009 ). Moreover, outcome-based measures are 'a mix of policy and incentive' (Hatton, 2014 ) and therefore do not just reflect the policy dimension.
2 This section briefly elaborates on the measures that comply with the selection criteria. More detailed information on each of these sources can be found in appendix A.
Several studies provide a measure of policy stance by identifying major changes in different policy dimensions which allows to keep track of the evolution in migration policies over time. These are typically combined into an indicator of the timing and direction of policy changes, where a shift in the index value reflects a significant increase or decrease in the tightness of a particular dimension of immigration law.
In particular, Ortega and Peri (2009) and Mayda (2010) create dummies tracking the change in OECD policies that target economic migrants (OP).
3 More broadly, the UN's International Immigration Policies
Database (IIPD) provides accurate and objective information on the existence of certain policies on immigration and emigration. None of these dummies, however, provide information on the initial level of restrictiveness nor on the relative magnitude of the change; i.e. no distinction can be made between gradual policy adaptation versus big bang reforms (Czaika and De Haas, 2013) .
One exception is the DEMIG POLICY database compiled as part of the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG) project (see de Haas et al., 2015) . It describes the direction and magnitude of 6500 changes in immigration and emigration policies in 45 countries, forming the largest change-tracking database completed to date. Unlike previously constructed databases, it disaggregates major policy changes into their individual policy measures and specifies which migrant group was targeted by each policy measure. However, its unit of analysis is a policy change occurring in a specific country and year rather than the country-year pair itself and the database was not constructed for the purpose of crosscountry comparisons (de Haas et al., 2015) . As a result, we cannot use the DEMIG POLICY database in the construction of our measures of immigration policies. Nevertheless, the disaggregation provides information on migration policy changes towards specific migrant groups (e.g. high versus low skilled workers). As such, DEMIG POLICY provides an indication of changes in selectivity of migration policies, which will prove particularly useful in Section 2.5.
Only a handful of data collection initiatives construct indicators of migration policy that can effectively 2 The effectiveness of migration policies cannot be tested using outcome-based measures without accounting for potential endogeneity stemming from the fact that these measures are influenced by the same factors as the immigrant flow itself (Czaika and De Haas, 2013 1990 -2005 (Jacobs, 2011 .
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Data availability is expected to substantially improve further in the future by a number of ongoing projects such as the International Migration Policy And Law Analysis (IMPALA). The latter attempts to measure immigration policies in a fundamentally different way, distinguishing between different 'entry tracks' (which can be considered the most elementary level in immigration policy) and registering relevant laws and regulations for each of them (Beine et al., 2015) . In terms of transparency and comprehensiveness, i.e. quality of the data, this will constitute a major step forward. However, as Beine et al. (2015) note, projects like IMPALA will probably not resolve all the outstanding issues in the construction of a composite index of (the restrictiveness of) a country's immigration policy. When new datasets like IMPALA become available, they can be fairly easily integrated in future versions of the migration policy indexes.
Constructing the Migration Policy Indexes
All together, these sources provide us with a database of over 250 indicators of migration policy (the full list can be found in appendix B). These were classified into the three categories traditionally distinguished in migration policy: (1) entry policies (including family reunification); (2) stay policies (permanent as 4 For an application using this indicator to investigate the impact of aid on migration, see Berthélemy et al. (2009). 5 Other comparable indicators which we do not consider (respectively because they fall out of our time range or because they are not publicly available are those constructed by Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) and Thielemann (2004) . The former created the migration institutional index for 14 OECD countries for the period 1870-1919, combining citizenship laws, land distribution policy, public education policy, and attitudes toward immigration, all of which enter the index with equal weight. Thielemann (2004) , on the other hand, constructed an asylum deterrence index for 20 OECD countries between 1985-1999 based on the OECD's Trends in International Migration and the US Committee for Refugees' World Refugee Survey. The index aggregates a number of dummy variables to obtain a yearly indicator of asylum deterrence at the country level, but it has not been made publicly available.
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opposed to temporary migration); and (3) integration policies (including migrant rights). The main focus of the literature trying to explain the development and consequences of migration regulations has been on admission procedures, i.e. the first category. Nonetheless, using this database we can construct three different migration policy indexes M P I E , M P I S and M P I I , respectively of entry, stay and integration policies, that asses the restrictiveness of each of these sub-fields of migration policy, as well as a comprehensive indicator M P I C reflecting the overall stance of migration policy.
However, combining the different indicators of migration policy is less straightforward than it seems.
The biggest problem when aggregating the information are the differences in availability of the various databases, as figure 1 illustrates. The black line shows the number of available data points in each year as a percentage of the total number if all indicators were available for each country. Data availability between 1996 and 2006 is never more than 3%, it jumps to 10% in 2007 and continues to increase slowly to 15% in 2014. The sharp increase is caused by the availability of MIPEX data in the second half of the 2000s. While less severe, the problem persists when the sample is limited to the 38 countries for which we have information on both the level and the change in the restrictiveness of migration policy (the blue dashed line). 6 Any index that ignores this availability problem will be distorted, making it impossible to distinguish actual changes in migration policy from changes in the availability of the underlying data. A factor that further complicates the aggregation of these indicators is that their characteristics It also has an intuitive and easy solution for missing data that relies on the fact that the state-space model uses the temporal dimension of the data to increase the reliability of the estimates. The weights of the individual indicators and the temporal dimension is chosen such that it matches whatever pattern is present in the underlying indicators. Moreover, the estimation will return the entire distribution of the policy indexes at each point in time. This enables us to correctly take the underlying uncertainty into account when comparing the indexes over time or over countries and when using them in further regressions.
The state-space model
This section outlines the state-space model that is used to construct the migration policy indexes, focussing on the entry policy index M P I E . The stay and integration subindexes M P I S and M P I I are then computed in the same way. The comprehensive index of migration policy is subsequently computed as the simple average of these three indexes, i.e. M P I C = 1 3 M P I E + M P I S + M P I I , in order to guarantee that the entry, stay and integration policy components are equally weighted.
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The standard state-space model is defined by a measurement equation (1) 
where κ i,t ∼ N (0, H κ ) and subscripts i and t refer to the country and year, respectively.
By changing the measurement equation of some of the variables, we can adjust the model to deal with indicators whose level cannot be compared across countries. For these indicators, the constant c κ i
is allowed to differ across countries, thereby capturing the fact that the initial policy level was unknown.
7 When M P I C is constructed based on the state-space model using all indicators, the comprehensive index ends up being very similar to the component with the highest data availability, i.e. the integration policy index. 8 Cross-correlation between the error terms of different indicators is ruled out: E( k 1 k 2 ) = 0.
In this case the measurement equation becomes:
We can also modify the measurement equation to deal with the dichotomous nature of some variables.
To this end, we augment the model using a continuous latent variable y in the style of a logit or probit model which gives:
The state equation, on the other hand, captures the fact that migration policy by definition has a unit root: unless some government action is taken to change it, policy today is the same as that of yesterday.
9 To that end, this equation consists of two components: the lagged migration policy index and a term capturing the yearly change in policy, µ i,t . The latter is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and its standard deviation is set to one to ensure that the model is identified. The underlying assumption is that the current restrictiveness or openness of migration policy does not tell us how it will change over time. Rather, the only indication of change in migration policy will come from the measurement equation and the indicators collected in y κ i,t .
M P I
The state equation is used to predict the current level of openness, using the future and past level of openness. This prediction is then updated using the indicators collected, as described in the measurement equation. The more reliable an indicator is (the smaller H κ ), the stronger the effect of this updating step on the final estimate.
Before the model can be run, missing observations are replaced by random and meaningless noise:
if y κ i,t is missing, it is set to zero while the variance of its error term H κ i,t is set to infinity. As a result, the state-space model will ignore the information in these observations since they come from a source whose measurement error is infinitely large. Nevertheless, the information is no longer missing allowing the model to be run. Given that M P I E depends on its previous values, the information in preceding and future observations will be used to impute the level of entry policy at time t. This will be done within the model, removing the need to impute or manipulate the data ex ante in some other way.
In contrast to the correlation over time, the model does not take the potential spatial correlation of migration policy into account. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this does not rule out that 9 We also estimated a version of the model where the level of time dependence was allowed to vary for each country show evidence of spatial correlation this will be reflected in the indexes. This information is simply not used in the estimations, as this would require us to impose a specific spatial correlation structure on the data.
Estimation using a Bayesian Gibbs sampler
The state-space models of the migration policy indexes were estimated on the sample of 38 countries that include (at least one) indicator that tracks the level of restrictiveness, leaving aside the 157 countries that only cover the change in migration policy. Restricting the estimation sample in this way allows us to better compare the characteristics of the different indicators of migration policy (i.e. the scaling parameters c κ , c κ i , z and variance H κ ). As shown in Figure 1 , focussing on this sample significantly decreases the fraction of missing observations. Nonetheless, once these parameters are estimated using this subsample, the indexes can be computed for the entire world. Note however that for the 157 countries where data on the level of restrictiveness is missing, the indexes can only be used for comparisons over time.
The state-space model is estimated using a Bayesian Gibbs sampler, i.e. a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimator. This technique is built on the separation of complex (posterior) probabilities into much easier to solve conditional probabilities. If the values of the M P I E index were known, the parameters of the state and measurement equations could be estimated using simple linear regressions and we could easily compute the distribution of their parameters. Similarly, if these parameters were known, we could compute and draw from the distribution of M P I E using a simulation smoother. Iteratively drawing from these conditional distributions (while conditioning on the last drawn value), will produce draws that converge to the original unconditional distribution (Kim and Nelson, 1999) .
To estimate each indicator, the Gibbs sampler is run for 100,000 iterations, of which the first 50,000
are discarded as burn-in. 10 The remaining iterations are used to compute the expected value, standard deviation and other characteristics of the migration policy indexes. The comprehensive M P I C and its characteristics are then constructed by first normalising the indexes M P I E , M P I S and M P I I such that their expected value and standard deviation over all countries and years is zero and one, respectively.
Rather than taking the average of the expected values of the indexes, M P I C is computed as the average 10 The burn-in are the first iterations of the Gibbs sampler that are discarded to ensure that the starting value of the iterative estimation process no longer influences the results. As this is a Bayesian estimator, we also have to be explicit about the prior assumptions, but since ex-ante information on the distribution of the parameters is lacking, we use uninformative (flat) priors.
over the different iterations of each index. As a result, its standard deviation, confidence intervals and other characteristics still fully reflect the (un)certainty of the different migration policy indexes of which it is composed.
as the normalised l th iterations of the entry, stay and integration policy indexes, we can write the l th iteration of the comprehensive migration policy index as
As was the case for the subcomponents, these different iterations allow us to compute the (expected value of) M P I C , its standard deviation and confidence interval. Moreover, the separate iterations can also be used in multiple imputation or Gibbs sampling analyses to ensure that any subsequent regressions take the (un)certainty of the migration policy indexes into account.
The Migration Policy Indexes
The results of the estimation procedure are the three indexes M P I E , M P I S and M P I I measuring the restrictiveness of entry, stay and integration policies as well as the comprehensive indicator M P I C which combines information on all three dimensions. All four indicators can be interpreted in the same way: an increase in the index value corresponds to an increase in the openness towards migration. These index values can be compared over time without any restrictions. However, in cross-sectional comparisons the indexes of only 38 countries can be used, as the others lack information on the (initial) level of openness.
The four indexes hide a great variability in the underlying indicators. This correlation coefficient is small for most indicators and sometimes even negative. The uncertainty is in turn reflected in the confidence bounds of the migration policy indexes which are relatively large.
For instance, the (normalised) immigration entry index of the countries that can be compared crosssectionally ranges from −6.4 to 1.1 with an average width of the confidence intervals of 1.5. As the mean of M P I E was set to zero, its distribution is clearly skewed to the left. In contrast, the comprehensive migration index has a much more symmetrical distribution that ranges from −4.7 to 4.9. This results from the observation that the lowest entry scores are compensated by higher values on the stay and especially the integration indexes. Overall, we find that the correlation of the stay with the entry index is only 0.18, while the correlation with the integration index is negative (−0.17).
Even when the uncertainty of the indexes is taken into consideration, the indexes are informative about the countries' migration policy. By way of illustration, figure 3 plots over time the values of M P I E and M P I C for the US, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, together with their 95% confidence intervals.
For Germany and the Netherlands, we notice a significant increase in the restrictiveness of immigration entry policy since 1996, in contrast with Sweden and the US. The more comprehensive index of migration policy (M P I C ) on the other hand remains relatively constant over time, with the exception of the significant increase in openness in the case of Sweden. While initially the level of restrictiveness was more or less the same for these four countries, the different trends in their policy and shrinking confidence intervals result in significant differences for both indexes of migration policy in 2014. The contrast between the evolution of M P I E and M P I C for Germany and the Netherlands (and to a lesser extent Sweden) provides further evidence for the evolution towards a more restrictive entry policy which is compensated by improved integration rights over the past two decades. A more general characterisation of the trends in migration policy requires that the uncertainty of the estimates is dealt with in a more systematic way. As mentioned in the previous section, the different draws from the Gibbs sampler estimation procedure can be used to identify the significance of differences in the index values across countries and over time. Specifically, if in more than 95% of the draws, the M P I value of country A is larger than that of country B, we can state that country A is significantly more open with respect to that policy dimension than country B at the 5% significant level. These significant differences allow us to construct a ranking of the countries in each year using two simple rules. Firstly, a country will have rank x+1 if it is significantly more open than at least one country with rank x. Secondly, if a country's policy is not significantly different from that of any other country, it cannot be ranked. The advantage of constructing a ranking in this way is that small differences between countries will not lead to a different ranking unless they can be identified as statistically significant (Standaert, 2015) . Figure 4 shows the results for the 38 countries whose level can be compared. Panels a and b plot the openness of M P I E and M P I C values in 2014. When uncertainty is taken into account, the entry (comprehensive) policy index is reduced to 5 (9) groups of countries whose level of restrictiveness is not significantly different from one another (panels c and d). In terms of both indexes, Europe is significantly more restrictive compared to North America or Australia, though the difference is much less pronounced in terms of the comprehensive migration policy index than the immigration entry policy index. In general, the different indexes lead to different country rankings, which is in line with the earlier observation from figure 3 hinting at a trade-off between entry immigration policy and integration policy and staying conditions.
In contrast to the differences between countries, changes over time can be computed for all countries in the dataset. Panels a and b of figure 5 show the change in the M P I E and M P I C values between 1996 and 2014. Panels c and d depict how many of these are significant at the 10% level. Comparing significant changes and changes overall show the importance of taking the uncertainty of the estimations into account. Regarding immigration entry policy, we observe a significant increase of restrictiveness in most (Western) European countries. Given the period under consideration, i.e. that of EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, it seems that a substantial number of old member states combined increased mobility within Europe with a more restrictive policy with respect to third countries. Though still present, the increase in restrictiveness is less outspoken for the comprehensive migration policy index (for which Sweden and Finland show the highest increase in liberalisation). Migration policy outside Europe seems to have remained more or less unchanged in terms of restrictiveness between 1996 and 2014. The only exception is the US where the comprehensive migration policy (but not immigration entry policy) has become slightly but significantly more liberal.
Spatial dependence
In line with earlier findings, the geographical grouping of shades in figures 4 and 5 suggests that neighbouring countries converge in the level of migration policy restrictiveness and point to cross-country correlation in migration policy determination. Migration regulations in one country seem to depend not only on local determinants, but also on the restrictiveness of migration policies in alternative destinations. 
No data (b) Change in M P I C between 1996 and 2014
No data (c) Significant changes in M P I E between 1996 and 2014
(d) Significant changes in M P I C between 1996 and 2014
Notes: Plot of the changes in M P I E (a), M P I C (b) and of the significant changes at the 10% level (c and d). Red (blue) indicates that migration policy became more restrictive (open), with the brightness indicating the size of the change.
Furthermore, spatial correlation might also stem from the increased harmonisation of migration policies, like that following the creation of the Schengen Area within the European Union.
To test for the presence of spatial dependence in our constructed indicators of migration policy M P I E and M P I C , we run a series of Moran's I tests. Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics of these Moran's I tests using either a row-normalised contiguity or inverse-distance spatial weight matrix, respectively.
Specifically, we run separate Moran's I tests for each year of the converged M P I draws of the Gibbs sampler and report yearly averages and standard deviations of the Moran's I statistic in the second and third columns, as well as the percentage of those yearly draws for which the Moran's I null hypothesis of no spatial correlation can be rejected at the 10%, 5% or 1% significance level. Note: M ean denotes the yearly mean of the Moran's I test statistics over the converged M P I draws of the Gibbs sampler using a row-normalised contiguity spatial weight matrix. Std reflects the yearly standard deviation of the Moran's I test statistics over the converged M P I draws of the Gibbs sampler. The last three columns reveal the share of M P I draws for which the Moran's I is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
The test results provide strong support for positive spatial correlation in migration policies across countries. Starting off at rather small values, the cross-country correlation in migration regulations gradually becomes stronger over the years, both in terms of size and significance. As this pattern corresponds to the changes in data availability, it is likely that larger confidence intervals hide the spatial correlation in the earlier years. The average Moran's I statistic is significant at 10% in more than half of the draws and, as of 2008, the null of no spatial correlation can be rejected in half the cases even at the 1% signifi- Note: M ean denotes the yearly mean of the Moran's I test statistics over the converged M P I draws of the Gibbs sampler using a row-normalised inverse-distance spatial weight matrix. Std reflects the yearly standard deviation of the Moran's I test statistics over the converged M P I draws of the Gibbs sampler. The last three columns reveal the share of M P I draws for which the Moran's I is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
cance level for both indexes no matter the spatial weight matrix being used. Comparing the Moran's I values of M P I E and M P I C shows that while spatial correlation based on the comprehensive indicator is larger when using the contiguity matrix, this pattern is reversed when the inverse distance weight matrix is used.
Selectivity of migration policy
The patterns in migration policy revealed by the indices of policy restrictiveness can be complemented by adding information on the selectivity of migration policy. Selectivity refers to the circumstance where entry conditions apply differently to individuals depending on their education level or nationality. In other words, selectivity relates to restrictiveness as income distribution relates to average income. Given the multidimensionality of selectivity (e.g. in terms of eduction, occupation, or nationality) and in absence of a systematical coding of policy measures at the level of each relevant group of immigrants (whether in levels or changes), the selectivity of migration policy should be considered orthogonal to restrictiveness and measured and described independently. Ideally, we would compose an index of selectivity for each dimension.
We know of only one source (the DEMIG database described above) from which we can derive information on changes in selectivity of migration policy. Unfortunately, unlike the other indicators, the DEMIG database is constructed at the level of policy measures instead of county-year pairs. Moreover, it was not constructed for the use of cross-country comparisons; using it to create a reliable cross-country measure would require a recoding at the most basic level (de Haas et al., 2015) . However, as it is the only available source on selectivity, we use it to create a simple indicator that measures migration policy selectivity in terms of skill level.
11 Given its obvious methodological problems, this indicator should not be viewed as an attempt to measure selectivity that is on par with the M P I indexes capturing the restrictiveness of policy, though.
The DEMIG dataset identifies close to 400 policy measures targeting either high-skilled or low-skilled migrants, of which the vast majority deal with entry and stay requirements. We labeled these measures as selectivity-increasing when they lowered the number of low-skilled workers, raised the number of highskilled workers, or when they raised the skill-requirements for entry. In contrast, restrictiveness increases when both the number of high and low-skilled workers decreases or skill requirements rise. The policy changes were coded negative when they raised selectivity and vice versa. They were weighted using DEMIG's assessment of the magnitude of the policy change, ranging from a fine-tuning (1) to a major policy change (4). As the DEMIG dataset claims to contain a complete list of all policy changes in the 45 countries that it covers, we created the measure of selectivity by simply computing the running total of such policy changes in each year since the end of World War II.
Restrictiveness turns out to be a bad predictor of selectivity and vice versa. The correlation between both the level and changes in these variables stands at 0.14 and −0.1, respectively, neither of which is significantly different from zero. These findings corroborate the idea that selectivity and restrictiveness are two orthogonal dimensions of migration policy. However, when plotted on a world map (figure 6), it quickly becomes clear that some of the least restrictive countries according to the M P I C index are also the most selective, in particular Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the United States. For the most part, the more restrictive countries are less selective, but there are exceptions to this rule. Germany for example is both selective and restrictive, while Portugal is relatively open and not-selective.
11 While the DEMIG database also contains information on the selectivity based on country of origin, combining this data into a similar country-year indicator is much harder as the impact of these measures will also depend on the relative importance of that country of origin in the group of potential migrants. A bilateral index of migration restrictiveness therefore lies outside of the scope of this paper. and 'supply'. Policy demand is represented by the collective action of economic agents based on their individual preferences with respect to immigration and policy supply by the institutional structure of public policy based on politicians' preferences (e.g. in terms of their re-election). Models of immigration policy of this type predominantly deal with the 'demand side' of immigration policy, focussing on the economic and non-economic factors that determine individual attitudes towards immigration that result in collective action through various channels.
With respect to the economic factors that influence individuals' attitude towards immigration, Razin
and Sadka (2000) and Facchini and Mayda (2009) distinguish between the labour market, the welfare state (redistribution) and the efficiency (immigration surplus) effects. The demand-side preferences are also shaped by non-economic considerations such as political power, cultural aversion or 'compositional amenities' (Card et al., 2012) . It is unclear which of these factors will eventually dominate. Whereas Individual preferences with respect to immigration are channeled to policy demand by means of collective action, which is the basis of the median voter model developed by Benhabib (1996) . In a straightforward setting (constant returns to scale production using labour and human or physical capital), he showed that the median voter will prefer the type of immigration that is the most complementary to her own endowments if immigration policy is determined by majority voting, but some of the implications of this model are less realistic. Razin and Sadka (2000) Moreover, from a median voter perspective, actual migration policies also seem more open than one would expect. Several explanations for this discrepancy have been offered: policy toughness could already be high in general; immigrant policies aimed at controlling economic migration flows might be inefficient; the policies might affect the composition of immigration flows rather than their level; or it might be due to lobbying activities of special interest groups. Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) propose a simplified pressure group model, with empirical evidence provided by . However, Milner and Tingley (2011) argue that pressure groups are more likely to influence specific measures rather than shaping overall immigration policy. They show that both economic self-interest and ideological determinants can be powerful determinants of immigration policy but that their relative importance depends upon the specific policy dimension under consideration.
Finally, supported by the preliminary Moran's I-tests presented in the previous section, we expect that a country does not determine its (immigration) policy in isolation from other (host) countries. Though the theoretical literature has not paid much attention to interdependence in migration policies, Giordani and Ruta (2013) formally show that for symmetrical countries, choosing the same level of openness as their neighbouring countries is optimal.
Empirical specification and estimation issues
To explain the restrictiveness of immigration policy, we need proxies for the characteristics of the median voter as well as for the strength or influence of interest groups. Because we also account for cross-country policy correlation, our estimations require a balanced panel structure. As a result, data availability and the sample selection bias it may induce seriously constrain the number of empirical proxies that can be used. 12 Nevertheless, we can control for the theoretically most relevant observable characteristic of the median voter: i.e. her age. Specifically, we include the old age dependency ratio (as a proxy for population ageing) and public welfare expenditures related to old age (in terms of GDP). 13 The political preferences of the median voter are proxied by past migration flows as a share of the host country population.
Data availability also seriously hampers the inclusion of indicators of interest groups' efforts to influence migration policy to their benefit. Theoretically, this is represented by the financial expenditures for lobbying, but (comparable) data on lobbying are unfortunately missing for many countries. Instead, we proxy interest group activity by annual GDP growth (as an indicator of labour demand dynamics) and by labour union membership (following Facchini and Mayda, 2009 ). The latter acts as an indicator of organisational strength and institutional pressure of the labour movement, though its signal can be very distorted. 14 Similar to the empirical analysis of trade policy, some of these indicators might capture different determinants according to different theories (see e.g. Gawande and Krishna, 2003) . GDP growth could for instance also be interpreted as an indicator of immigration surplus which is a relevant economic interest of the median voter. In addition, the median voter's voting strategy (sincere or strategic) or forward looking behaviour (the impact of immigration on future political power) remain unobserved.
Finally, we include country fixed effects as a simple and efficient way to control for unobserved heterogeneity or control variables that do not vary over time. Given the poor quality of available annual data, this is the most appropriate way to control for the other main characteristic of the median voter besides age, i.e. skills. This results in the following empirical specification:
12 For example, to capture attitudes towards immigrants we extracted the replies to two questions from the 4th and 5th
wave of the World Value Surveys. The waves span the period 1999-2004 and 2005-2009 , respectively, but the construction of an annual series of attitudes towards immigrants in each country based on these data is impossible. Furthermore, we tried to approximate labour market dynamics using OECDStat employment rates (for native-and foreign-born by educational attainment) and ILO estimates of the employment to population ratio aged either 15+ or 15 to 24. Other indicators that were considered are the share of agriculture and construction in GDP (available for the period 1990-2013 but with gaps); the GINI index; and public spending on education and health in percentage of GDP, all of which are available from the World Development Indicators for the period 1960 to 2014 (with gaps). Yet, data availability for all these measures remains too poor to construct a sufficiently large panel dataset that would allow to obtain accurate estimation results. 13 We also experimented with a measure of skill abundance of the working population calculated as the share of the population aged 25 to 34 without tertiary education, compiled from United Nations and OECD population statistics.
However, the many missing values reduced the sample size to such an extent that we decided not to include it in our empirical analysis. 14 The union membership ratio of the workforce in France, for instance, is comparable to (if not lower than) that of the US, despite substantial differences in the impact of unions on public policy. As alternative proxies for the strength of special interest groups, we also considered measures of union density and union coverage available at ILO, but their availability is limited to the periods 2001-2011 and 2002-2012, respectively. 20 where M P I it is an indicator of migration policy openness in country i at time t (i.e. either M P I Table 3 reports the estimation results for four specifications of the SAR model (which differ in the set of explanatory variables that is included) and this for both M P I E and M P I C . All specifications include a spatial lag and are estimated using a Gibbs sampler. The reported coefficients and corresponding pvalues in brackets reported in the first two rows for each variable ignore the fact that M P I is an estimated variable. The third and fourth rows, subsequently, account for the uncertainty in the migration policy indicators by making use of the different draws of M P I E and M P I C . In each iteration, the Gibbs sampler draws a value from the distribution of the M P I indexes (obtained from the state-space model) which is then used to compute the distribution of the parameters of the SAR model (β and γ) to ultimately get their expected values and standard deviations.
Estimation results
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In line with expectations, we find a strong negative impact of past migration flows on the openness of entry policies, suggesting that admission procedures become tougher as more immigrants settle in the -i.e. the (partial) relief immigration might provide to cope with the burden of an ageing populationbut rather dominated by other motivations or cultural concerns.
19 Re-estimating the model excluding either old age expenditures (specification 2) or the old age dependency ratio (specification 3) does not significantly alter these findings.
Furthermore, in the non-robust estimations, we obtain a positive significant impact of union membership. This contradicts the prediction of the interest group approach as trade unions are expected to organise primarily those domestic workers for whom immigrant workers form the closest substitute.
The significant impact is preserved in the robust estimations for entry policies but not for the composite migration policy indicator. Yet, as argued above, union membership is a rather poor proxy of the labour movement's organisational strength and institutional pressure and might hence produce misleading conjectures. Also, the influence of union strength on migration policies is expected to be negative only if immigration is low-skilled (i.e. we generally expect much less opposition against an inflow of high-skilled immigrants), which is not necessarily the case. In order to test whether the inclusion of union membership also distorts the estimated impact of the other determinants, we re-estimated the model without it. Except for the impact of the old age dependency ratio which now becomes insignificant in the robust regressions, this does not alter our main findings.
Finally, the most important finding concerns the significantly positive coefficient for the spatial lag of entry (i.e. immigration) policy. This is the case in all four specifications, in both the non-robust and robust estimations. The effect varies between 0.24 and 0.30 using a contiguity-based spatial weight matrix and between 0.56 and 0.64 based on the inverse-distance spatial weight matrix. It thus seems that changes in the restrictiveness of admission procedures in one country have direct implications for similar procedures in other countries. The fact that spatial correlation is larger based on the inverse-distance matrix might indicate that it captures a tendency towards harmonisation (like in the EU member states, though at this stage this mainly concerns common rules for family reunion and the single permit directive)
or peer reference effects (the policy impact of a shock on voting preferences in a peer country). 20 The spatial autoregressive coefficient (ρ) is only robustly significant for immigration entry policy (M P I E ), but not for the more comprehensive migration policy index (M P I C ), though. This can be an indication of a still substantial national margin in migration policies, in particular in the less visible policy segments such as staying conditions and integration rights. This is to some extent surprising given that many of 19 This in line with the finding by Card et al. (2012) that compositional concerns explain more than two-thirds of the differences in -negative-opinions about immigration policy between young and older respondents, a finding that is robust across countries. 20 To the extent that the spatial dependence is caused primarily by competition between countries, we would expect a larger spatial correlation for contiguous countries.
24 the host countries of immigration in our sample could be considered quite symmetrical.
Conclusion
In this paper, we bring together all publicly available indicators of migration policy to construct indexes capturing countries' openness of regulations in three dimensions: entry, stay and integration. These three indexes are then brought together in a comprehensive index of the restrictiveness of migration policy.
To create these indicators, we rely on a Bayesian state-space model that is able to differentiate between the individual measures in terms of their reliability. By using the time-dependence in the underlying indicators and circumventing the problem of missing observations, the state-space model can provide more stable and reliable estimates. It significantly increases data availability and coverage without imputations or other ad-hoc manipulations. Moreover, the reliability of the migration policy indicators can easily be taken into account in any subsequent computations or regressions.
The estimated migration policy indexes are then used to empirically analyse the influence of determinants taken from the major political economy hypotheses typically used to explain the restrictiveness of migration policies in the OECD as well as the impact of potential interdependence in migration policies across countries. We estimate a spatial autoregressive model using a Gibbs sampling approach to take the uncertainty in the constructed policy indexes into account. Our results provide significant indications of a positive cross-country correlation in the restrictiveness of migration policy, in particular in immigration entry policy. The sign and significance of the determinants in our estimations suggest that migration policy is rooted in a more complex framework where dynamic political economy and strategic motivations are taken into account, or in which political or cultural rather than economic arguments tend to prevail.
A natural direction for future research includes a deeper exploration of selectivity in migration policy in addition to its restrictiveness discussed in this paper. A number of entry conditions apply differently to individuals with a different level of education, and a similar level of restrictiveness can hide different levels of selectivity. Similarly, some policies are bilateral in nature. A better understanding of this selectivity both in terms of skill levels and nationality would allow a more thorough understanding of migration policy. However, only one of the indicators satisfies the criteria above and is retained:
A Selection of the migration policy indicators
the proportion of non-DAC students in all foreign students. 22
21 We do not consider the indicators related to emigration or those reporting government views on migration levels. 22 The other two indicators are measured as the gross inflow of migrants from developing countries and the net increase in the number of unskilled migrant residents from developing countries, respectively. Hence, we do not consider them in 29 The project provides three indexes: one for immigrant groups, one related to historic national minorities and one related to indigenous peoples. We consider only the first one which examines the extent to which governments adopted each of the following eight policies: ( order to avoid endogeneity bias in the empirical analysis. 
B List of the migration policy indicators
C Estimation
Estimating the state-space model requires us to find the optimal values of both the parameters of the measurement equation (c, z and H), as well as the most likely value of index itself. With the addition of binary indicators and indicators that cannot be compared over countries, the state-space model quickly becomes a very complex estimation problem. However, the Gibbs sampler estimator allows us to split this complex problem up into multiple much easier to solve subroutines. Instead of estimating the joint probability of all variables at the same time (e.g. p(a, b)), the Gibbs sampler works with conditional probabilities (p(a|b) and p(b|a)). It iteratively draws b i from p(b|a i−1 ) after which a i is drawn from p(a|b i ). It can be shown that after thousands of draws, a i and b i will have converged to draws from the original unconditional probability p(a, b). Those converged draws can then be used to reconstruct this joint probability.
In this case, the Gibbs sampler has three main blocks, each consisting of several subroutines. Using
Priors
Because the state-space model is estimated in a Bayesian framework, it is necessary to specify the prior distribution of the parameters. However, since there is no prior information available on the parameters of the measurement equation, z, c and log(H), flat probabilities are used for these variables. This means that all values in R are equally probable.
p(c) ∝ 1 (k×1) ; (16) p(log(H)) ∝ I k×k .
Convergence
The Gibbs sampler algorithm ran 100,000 iterations of which the first 50,000 were discarded as burn-in.
The draws of the parameters of state and measurement equation were individually examined using simple plotted values, autocorrelation functions and a rolling window CUMSUMs. Figure 7 illustrates this for the first element of z. All point to a well-behaved, converged distribution, which is what is found for the other parameters as well. 
